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Abstract 
This paper theoretically investigates the effect of population aging on the employment 
share of an elder care service industry. We show that there exists the threshold level of 
income elasticity of demand for the elder care service, above which population aging 
spurs economic growth. In a closed economy, the threshold level is unity, whereas it 
exceeds unity in a small open economy. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Population aging is a phenomenon which many developed countries have faced recently. 
As more people live longer and the need for long-term care services increases, it may be 
natural to consider that more labor inputs will be allocated into the long-term care 
industry. There may be a concern that such a change slows economic growth because the 
productivity of the elder care industry is lower than that of other industries (e.g., a 
manufacturing industry).1 
Theoretically, van Groezen et al. (2005) showed that the above-mentioned concern 
does not necessarily hold true in a closed economy. On the other hand, van Groezen et al. 
(2005) and Hashimoto and Tabata (2010) argued that in a small open economy, the result 
differs from the result derived in a closed economy. They showed that population aging 
necessarily increases the employment share of the elder care industry and results in 
slower economic growth. The important point is that they assume that the utility function 
is homothetic, or equivalently, the income elasticity of demand for health care is unity.  
It is often reported that the income elasticity of demand for the long-term care differs 
from unity.2 We examine the case where the income elasticity is not unity, that is, where 
the preference is nonhomothetic.3 We show that when the income elasticity is larger 
than unity, it is theoretically possible that population aging may decrease the employment 
share of the elder care sector even in a small-open economy.  
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model and 
explores the effect of population aging on the employment share in a closed economy. In 
Section 3, we analyze these issues in a small open economy. Finally, Section 4 concludes 
the paper. 
  
 
1 Fujisawa and Colombo (2009) argues that the wage level of long-term care workers is lower than the 
national average wage, especially in Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
2 For example, in Japan, Ohkusa (2002) showed the elasticity of demand for long-term care exceeds 
unity. However, there is some controversy. Shimizutani and Noguchi (2004) argued that the level is 
lower than unity.  
3  Kongsamut et al. (2001) shows a mechanism where a structural change is driven by the 
non-homothetic preference of consumers. Matsuyama (2008) provides an excellent summary of 
research in this field.  
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2. The Effect of Population Aging in a Closed Economy 
 
We consider that two sectors of production exist: the commodity sector (labeled ܻ) and 
the elder care services sector (labeled ܯ). The price of ܻ is normalized to unity, and ݌௧ 
denotes the price of ܯ. Labor is perfectly mobile across the sectors, so that the wage rate 
is the same between the sectors. 
 
2.1. Firms 
Firms act competitively in both sectors. Commodity ܻ  can be used for either 
consumption or investment. The production technology is ௧ܻ ൌ ܨሺܭ௧, ܣ௧ܮ௒௧ሻ ൌ
ܭ௧ఈሺܣ௧ܮ௒௧ሻଵିఈ, where ܭ௧ and ܮ௒௧ denote physical capital and labor inputs hired in the 
commodity sector, respectively, and ܣ௧ ൐ 0 denotes a productivity parameter. The elder 
care sector is a labor-intensive industry, and for simplicity, we assume ܯ௧ ൌ ܤܮெ௧, 
where ܮெ௧  denotes the labor inputs employed in sector ܯ . Let ߥ௧  denote the 
employment share of sector ܻ , ܮ௒௧ ሺܮ௒௧ ൅ ܮெ௧ሻ⁄ .
4  ܣ௧  evolves according to ܣ௧ ൌ
݃ሺߥ௧ሻܣ௧ିଵ, and each firm considers the level of ܣ௧ as given. A similar formulation is 
seen in van Groezen et al. (2005). We assume ݃ᇱሺߥ௧ሻ ൐ 0 and ݃ሺ0ሻ ൌ 1. Defining a 
capital-effective labor ratio as ݇௧ ؠ ܭ௧/ሺܣ௧ܮ௒௧ሻ, the production of ܻ per effective unit 
of labor is described by ݂ሺ݇௧ሻ ൌ ݇௧α. Through the profit-maximization behavior of firms 
in sector ܻ, the interest rate ݎ௧ and wage rate ݓ௧ are derived, respectively, as follows: 
ݎ௧ ൌ ݂ᇱሺ݇௧ሻ ൌ ߙ݇௧ఈିଵ,    ݓ௧ ൌ ܣ௧ሺ݂ሺ݇௧ሻ െ ݂ᇱሺ݇௧ሻ݇௧ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻܣ௧݇௧ఈ. (1) 
We assume that physical capital fully depreciates during the production process, so that 
ݎ௧ represents a gross interest rate. Furthermore, we obtain: 
݌௧ ൌ
ݓ௧
ܤ
, (2) 
by considering the optimal behavior of firms in sector ܯ. 
 
2.2. Households 
We consider an overlapping-generations model where agents live at most two periods, 
referred to as young and old. The population size of each generation is the same and 
                                                  
4 In this paper, the market size of an industry refers to the share of each industry in the labor market. 
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normalized to unity. Each agent faces uncertainty concerning his or her longevity, and ݍ௧ 
denotes the probability that agents can be alive in their old period, and it is treated as 
exogenous. The expected utility function is given by: 
ܧ ௧ܷ ൌ log ܿଵ௧ ൅ ߚݍ௧ሾߜ log ܿଶ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ݄ሺ݉௧ାଵሻሿ, (3) 
where ܿଵ௧  and ܿଶ௧ାଵ denote the consumption of commodity ܻ when young and old, 
respectively, and ݉௧ାଵ denotes the consumption of the care services when old. β and δ 
represent the discount rate and an old agent’s taste regarding the trade-off between 
commodity and care services. ݄ሺ݉ሻ stands for the utility from the elder care, and we 
assume that σ௠ ؠ– ݄ԢԢሺ݉ሻ݉ ݄Ԣሺ݉ሻ ൒ 0⁄  is constant.5 When σ௠ ൌ 1, the preference is 
homothetic; otherwise, it is nonhomothetic. 
When young, each agent has one unit of labor endowment and works. We assume the 
existence of the Yaari-type competitive insurance companies. That is, the rate of return 
on the annuity is ݎ௧ାଵ/ݍ௧ . Denoting the purchase of the annuity by ݏ௧ , budget 
constraints are expressed as: 
ܿଵ௧ ൅ ݏ௧ ൌ ݓ௧, (4) 
ܿଶ௧ାଵ ൅ ݌௧ାଵ݉௧ାଵ ൌ
ݎ௧ାଵ
ݍ௧
ݏ௧. (5) 
Agents maximize (3) subject to (4) and (5) and consequently, the following equations are 
obtained: 
ܿଶ௧ାଵ ൌ ߚߜݎ௧ାଵܿଵ௧, (6) 
ሺ1 െ ߜሻ݄ᇱሺ݉௧ାଵሻ ൌ ߜ
݌௧ାଵ
ܿଶ௧ାଵ
. (7) 
 
 
  
                                                  
5 A typical functional form is ݄ሺ݉ሻ ൌ ሺ݄ଵିఙ೘ െ 1ሻ ሺ1 െ ߪ௠ሻ⁄  when ߪ௠ ് 1, and ݄ሺ݉ሻ ൌ log ݄ 
when ߪ௠ ൌ 1.  
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2.3. Markets 
There are four kinds of markets: commodity, elder care services, capital, and labor 
markets. The market clearing condition for the elder care services is given by: 
ܤܮெ௧ ൌ ݍ௧ିଵ݉௧. (8) 
By using the definition of ݇௧, the equilibrium condition for the asset market, ݏ௧ ൌ ܭ௧ାଵ, 
is rewritten as: 
ݏ௧ ൌ ܣ௧ାଵܮ௒௧ାଵ݇௧ାଵ. (9) 
Noting that ܮ௧ ൌ 1 and using ߥ௧, the labor market clearing conditions are written as: 
ܮ௒௧ ൌ ߥ௧, ܮெ௧ ൌ 1 െ ߥ௧. (10) 
Walras’ law guarantees that the commodity market always clears when (8)–(10) hold. 
 
2.4. Equilibrium 
Now, we are ready to derive the equilibrium allocation of the economy. Using (1), (4), (9), 
and (10), (6) is rewritten as: 
ܿଶ௧ାଵ ൌ ߚߜߙ݇௧ାଵఈିଵሾሺ1 െ ߙሻܣ௧݇௧ఈ െ ܣ௧ାଵߥ௧ାଵ݇௧ାଵሿ. (11) 
In addition, applying (1), (2  the ollowing equation: ), (8), and (10) to (7) yields  f
ሺ1 െ ߜሻ݄ᇱ ቆ
ܤሺ1 െ ߥ௧ାଵሻ
ݍ௧
ቇ ൌ ߜ
1 െ ߙ
ܤ
ܣ௧ାଵ݇௧ାଵఈ
ܿଶ௧ାଵ
. (12) 
Eq. (5) is rewritten by using ( , (2  and (8)–(10) as follows: 1) ),
ܿଶ௧ାଵ ൌ
ܣ௧ାଵ݇௧ାଵఈ
ݍ௧
൫ߥ௧ାଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ൯. (13) 
By substituting (13) for (12), we obtain: 
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ܪሺߥ௧ାଵ, ݍ௧ሻ ؠ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ݄ᇱ ቆ
ܤሺ1 െ ߥ௧ାଵሻ
ݍ௧
ቇ െ ߜ
1 െ ߙ
ܤ
·
ݍ௧
௧ାଵ ߙሻߥ െ ሺ1 െ
ൌ 0. (14) 
Here, ߥ௧ାଵ is solved as a function of ݍ௧ from (14); ߥ௧ାଵ ൌ  ߥሺݍ௧ሻ. The effect of the 
population aging on the employment shares of the ܻ and ܯ sectors is obtained by 
examining ߥᇱሺݍ ሻ௧ . 
Proposition 1: ߥᇱሺݍ௧ሻ ൐ 0 holds if and only if σ௠ ൏ 1. 
 
The proof is given in Appendix A. Proposition 1 argues that when σ௠ ൏ 1,  the 
employment share of the elder care services sector shrinks, and that of the commodity 
sector expands, in the process of population aging, which spurs the growth of ܣ௧. When 
σ௠ ൏ 1, the marginal rate of substitution, ሺ∂ܧ ௧ܷ ∂݉௧ାଵ⁄ ሻ ሺ∂ܧ ௧ܷ ∂ܿଶ௧ାଵ⁄ ሻ⁄ , increases 
along a ray (see the dotted indifference curve and the dotted line from the origin in Fig. 
16) and consequently, the income offer curve is depicted as in Fig. 1. This indicates that 
the income elasticity of demand for the care services exceeds unity. Similarly, σ ൌ 1 
corresponds to the case where e income elasticity is unity.  
௠
th
  When expected longevity ݍ௧  increases, the number of people who need ܯ  also 
increases, which has a positive impact on the aggregate demand for ܯ. On the other hand, 
an increase in ݍ௧ decreases the rate of return on annuity, which means that consumption 
in the old period is more expensive. This price effect has a negative impact on the demand 
for ܯ, and the negative impact becomes larger as the income elasticity of demand is 
greater. Proposition 1 argues that the critical value is unity in a closed economy, and that 
population aging has no impact on the relative employment share when σ௠ ൌ 1. This 
result is consistent with van Groezen et al. (2005).  
We briefly describe a dynamic equilibrium path of the effective capital-labor ratio, 
݇௧ ؠ ܭ௧ ሺܣ௧ܮ௒௧ሻ⁄ . From (11), (13), and ܣ௧ାଵ ܣ௧⁄ ൌ ݃ሺߥ௧ାଵሻ, we obtain:  
݇௧ାଵ ൌ ߁ሺݍ௧, ߥ௧ାଵሻ݇௧ఈ, (15) 
where ߁ሺݍ௧, ߥ௧ାଵሻ is defined as: 
                                                  
6 To make presentation simple, we omit a ܿଵ௧-axis when Fig. 1 is drawn.  
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߁ሺݍ௧, ߥ௧ାଵሻ ؠ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߙߜߚݍ௧
ሺ1 ൅ ߙߜߚݍ௧ሻߥ௧ା െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻଵ
·
1
݃ሺߥ௧ାଵሻ
. (16) 
Because ߥ௧ାଵ ൌ  ߥሺݍ௧ሻ, at a given level of ݍ௧, the nontrivial steady state exists uniquely 
and ሼ݇௦ሽ௦ୀ௧ஶ  converges to the steady state, as seen in (15). When ݍ௧ increases, two 
effects are found from (16). First, ∂߁ሺݍ௧, ߥ௧ାଵሻ ∂ݍ௧ ൐ 0⁄  indicates that an increase in ݍ௧ 
induces people to save more to provide for their old age. This is consistent with the result 
pointed out by Yakita (2001). Second, ∂߁ሺݍ௧, ߥ௧ାଵሻ ∂ߥ௧ାଵ ൏ 0⁄  indicates that an 
increase in ߥ௧ାଵ reduces ݇௧ାଵ. Thus, when ߥ ′ሺݍ௧ሻ ൐ 0, the levels of ሼ݇௦ሽ௦ୀ௧ାଵ∞  becomes 
smaller as the latter impact is larger. 
 
3. The Effect of Population Aging in a Small Open Economy  
 
We consider a small open economy, and assume that only capital and commodity ܻ are 
mobile across the border. The level of ݎ௧ and ݇௧ are fixed at ݎ and ݇, respectively, and 
ݎ ൌ ߙ݇ఈିଵ  holds from (1). The wage rate is expressed as ݓ௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ݇ఈܣ௧ . We 
impose the follo a io  wing ssumpt n.
Assumption 1: ݃ᇱሺߥሻ ൏ ݃ሺߥሻଶ ݎ⁄  holds. 
The equilibrium system is derived from (2), (4)–(8), and (10). (Note that (9) does not hold 
in a small open economy.) We obtain the following equations: 
ܿ ଵ ൌ ߚߜݎܿ , ଶ௧ା ଵ௧ (17) 
ሺ1 െ ߜሻ݄ᇱ ቆ
ܤሺ1 െ ߥ௧ାଵሻ
ݍ௧
ቇ ൌ ߜ
1 െ α
ܤ
݇ఈܣ௧ାଵ
1
ܿଶ௧ାଵ
, (18) 
ܿଵ௧ ൅
ݍ௧
ݎ
ܿଶ௧ାଵ ൅
1 െ ߙ
ߙ
݇ܣ௧ାଵሺ1 െ ߥ௧ାଵሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ݇ఈܣ௧. (19) 
Eq. (19) is the lifetime budget constraint derived from (4) and (5), and the third term on 
the left-hand side is obtained by using (2), (8), and (10). By using ܣ௧ାଵ ܣ௧⁄ ൌ ݃ሺߥ௧ାଵሻ 
and eliminating ܿଵ௧ and ܿଶ௧ାଵ from (17)–(19), the following equation is obtained: 
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ܤߚሺ1 െ ߜሻ݄ᇱ ቆ
ܤሺ1 െ ߥ௧ାଵሻ
ݍ௧
ቇ
1
݃ሺ ௧ାଵሻߥ
ൌ
1 ൅ ߜߚݍ௧
݃ሺߥ௧ାଵሻሺ1 െ ߥ௧ାଵሻݎ െ
. (20) 
ߥ௧ାଵ is solved as a function of ݍ௧, ߥ௧ାଵ ൌ ߥ෤ሺݍ௧ሻ. The effect of an increase in ݍ௧ on 
ߥ௧ାଵ is summarized in Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2: ߥ෤ᇱሺݍ௧ሻ ൐ 0 holds if and only if σ௠ ൏ ఋఉ௤೟ଵାఋఉ௤೟. 
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix B. We observe that when the income 
elasticity is unity (that is, σ௠ ൌ 1), ߥ෤ᇱሺݍ௧ሻ ൏ 0 always holds. This is consistent with the 
preceding literature. Proposition 2 also shows that it is theoretically possible that an 
increase in longevity decreases the employment share of the long-term care industry and 
raises the rate of economic growth.  
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks  
 
We examined whether population aging induces a sectoral shift towards the long-term 
care industry. Preceding studies have shown that the result derived in a closed economy 
differs from the result derived in a small open economy. This paper showed that such a 
sharp contrast is generated when the homothetic preference is assumed. We revealed that 
the main difference between the two economies is the threshold level concerning the 
income elasticity of demand for care services. The threshold level is unity in a closed 
model, whereas it exceeds unity in a small open economy. 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
Proposition 1 is proved by calculating the signs of ∂ܪሺߥ௧ାଵ, ݍ௧ሻ ∂ߥ௧ାଵ⁄  and 
∂ܪሺߥ௧ାଵ, ݍ௧ሻ ∂ݍ௧⁄ . As regards ∂ܪሺߥ௧ାଵ, ݍ௧ሻ ∂ߥ௧ାଵ⁄ ൐ 0, it is immediately confirmed. 
∂ܪሺߥ௧ାଵ, ∂ݍ calculated as follows: ݍ௧ሻ ௧⁄  is 
∂ܪሺߥ௧ାଵ, ݍ௧ሻ
∂ݍ௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ݄Ԣ
ᇱሺ݉௧ାଵሻ ൬െ
݉௧ାଵ
ݍ௧
൰ െ ߜ 
1 െ ߙ
ܤ
1
ߥ௧ାଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ
. 
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Applying (14) to the second term on the right-hand side yields: 
߲ܪሺߥ௧ାଵ, ݍ௧ሻ
߲ݍ௧
ൌ െ
1 െ ߜ
ݍ௧
݄ԢԢሺ݉௧ାଵሻ݉௧ାଵ െ
1 െ ߜ
ݍ௧
݄ᇱሺ݉௧ାଵሻ. 
Furthermore, by using the definition of e obtain: ߪ௠, w
߲ܪሺߥ௧ାଵ, ݍ௧ሻ
∂ݍ௧ ൌ
1 െ ߜ
ݍ௧
݄ᇱሺ݉௧ାଵሻሺߪ௠ െ 1ሻ. 
∂ܪሺߥ௧ାଵ, ݍ௧ሻ ∂ݍ௧⁄  is negative if and only if σ௠ ൐ 1. Thus, ߥᇱሺݍ௧ሻ is positive.  
 
Appendix B 
 
To prove Pr  ofoposition 2, we take the logarithm  (20): 
log ܤߚሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൅ log ݄ᇱ ቆ
ܤሺ1 െ ߥ௧ାଵሻ
ݍ௧
ቇ െ log ݃ሺߥ௧ାଵሻ
ൌ logሺ1 ൅ ߜߚݍ௧ሻ െ log൫ݎ െ ݃ሺߥ௧ାଵሻሺ െ ߥ௧ାଵሻ൯. 1
Totally differentiating this equation with respect to ߥ  and ݍ௧ yields the following 
equation
௧ାଵ
: 
݄Ԣᇱሺ݉௧ାଵሻ
݄ᇱሺ݉௧ାଵሻ
ቈെ
ܤ
ݍ௧
݀ߥ௧ାଵ െ
ܤሺ1 െ ߥ௧ାଵሻ
ݍ௧
ଶ ݀ݍ௧቉ െ
݃Ԣሺߥ௧ାଵሻ
݃ሺߥ௧ାଵሻ
݀ߥ௧ାଵ
ߜߚ
ൌ
1 ൅ ߜߚݍ௧
݀ݍ௧ െ
݃ሺߥ௧ାଵሻ െ ݃Ԣሺߥ௧ାଵሻሺ1 െ ߥ௧ାଵሻ
ݎ െ ݃ሺߥ௧ାଵሻሺ1 െ ߥ௧ାଵሻ
݀ߥ௧ାଵ. 
By using σ௠ ؠ– ݄ԢԢሺ݉ሻ݉ ݄Ԣሺ݉ሻ⁄ , the first term on the left-hand side is written as 
௛ᇲᇲሺ௠೟శభሻ
௛ᇲሺ௠೟శభሻ
ቂെ ஻
௤೟
݀ߥ௧ାଵ െ
஻ሺଵିఔ೟శభሻ
௤೟
మ ݀ݍ௧ቃ ൌ ߪ௠ ቂ
ௗఔ೟శభ
ଵିఔ೟శభ
൅ ௗ௤೟
௤೟
ቃ. 
Con qu tly, e obtse en w ain: 
ቈ
ߪ
1 െ ଵ
௠
ߥ௧ା
൅
݃ ௧ା ௧ା
ሾ݃ሺߥ௧ାଵሻሿଶ െ ݃ᇱሺߥ௧ାଵሻݎ
ሺߥ௧ାଵሻ൫ݎ െ ݃ሺߥ ଵሻሺ1 െ ߥ ଵሻ൯
቉ ݀ߥ௧ାଵ ൌ ൤
ߜߚ
1 ൅ ߜߚݍ௧
െ
ߪ௠
ݍ௧
൨  ݀ݍ௧. 
Because ߪ௠ ൒ 0, the bracket of the left-hand side is positive under Assumption 1 (Note 
that from (20), the term ݎ െ ݃ሺߥ௧ାଵሻሺ1 െ ߥ௧ାଵሻ is positive). Thus, ݀ߥ௧ାଵ ݀ݍ௧ ൐ 0⁄  
holds if and only if ఋఉ
ଵାఋఉ௤೟
െ ఙ೘
௤೟
൐ 0, which is equivalent to ߪ௠ ൏ ߜߚݍ௧ ሺ1 ൅ ߜߚݍ௧ሻ⁄ . 
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Fig.1: Optimal consumption when ߪ௠ ൏ 1. 
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